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The 2017 Shareholder Rights Directive has paved the way towards adopting a model 
where shareholder power can be used as an accountability mechanism in European 
corporate governance by amending the 2007 Shareholder Rights Directive to en-
courage active shareholder participation. This model can ensure good governance 
practices, but practical implications can challenge its effectiveness. This paper seeks 
to outline the merits and the challenges this model must overcome to be effective. 
The Directive manifests EU corporate law’s adoption of a model where shareholders 
power is used to confer accountability in corporate governance. Despite the model’s 
merits, there are implications that may impede its effectiveness. Firstly, several prob-
lems related to agency capitalism and the establishment of collective action, such 
as participation costs, disclosure of information; free-riding and incentives of ex-
ercising shareholder rights can significantly affect proper shareholder engagement. 
Secondly, another implication is found on shareholder short-termism and the basis 
on which shareholder power is to be exercised to confer accountability. Though the 
Directive addresses these issues to some extent, the appropriate consideration of all 
issues of these implications is paramount. As such, the Directive is only the starting 
point towards the facilitation of shareholder power act as an accountability mech-
anism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted serious flaws in corporate governance 
and accountability and has questioned the extent European and National cor-
porate governance regulation was adequate to prevent these misconducts. As 
a reaction to the economic crisis, legal regulators reiterated a long-standing 
position of the European Union that shareholders must play a more responsible 
role in upholding accountability in corporate governance.1 This led to the in-
troduction of the 2017 Shareholder Rights Directive.2 The 2017 Directive seeks 
to amend the 2007 Shareholder Rights Directive3 in order to strengthen share-
holder monitoring; enhance transparency between companies and its investors 
and encourage active shareholder engagement for the long-term benefit of the 
company.4 In line then with an international upsurge in enhancing shareholder 
rights, European corporate law through the 2017 Shareholder Rights Directive 
paves the way towards adopting a corporate governance model where share-
holders act as an accountability body in corporate governance to prevent man-
agerial inefficiencies through the exercise of their respective rights. 
This model of corporate governance has undoubtedly its merits. An effective 
shareholder engagement is cornerstone to upholding good corporate gover-
nance; and can enhance the checks and balances between different organs of 
the company.5  Furthermore, the active exercise of shareholder rights can im-
prove corporate performance, by taking into account issues related to the com-
pany’s stakeholders or upholding public interest.6 Despite the merits of this 
model however, several implications can impede the exercise of shareholder 
power as an effective accountability mechanism; and can challenge the mod-
1 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The 
European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions: Action 
Plan: European company law and corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more 
engaged shareholders and sustainable companies (COM/2012/0740, 2012)
2 Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder en-
gagement (Shareholder Rights Directive 2017) (OJ L 132, 20.5.2017)
3 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies (Shareholder Rights Directive 
2007) (OJ L 184, 14.7.2007)
4 Shareholder Rights Directive 2017, [3]
5 ibid [14]
6 On stakeholder considerations in the company see Parkinson, J.E.: Corporate Power and 
Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, Oxford/ Oxford University Press, 2002; 
Dodd E. M.: For whom are corporate managers trustees, Harvard Law Review, 45 1932, 
p.1145
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el’s adequateness and effectiveness for securing good corporate governance 
practices for the company’s sustainable growth. 
This paper then seeks to highlight the merits of the model the 2017 Sharehold-
er Rights Directive seeks to introduce, as well as the challenges that European 
corporate law must address to ensure its effectiveness. Section 2 will state that 
the 2017 Shareholder Rights Directive contributes in the adoption of a corpo-
rate governance model where shareholders exercise their power to enhance 
accountability. Sections 3 and 4 will highlight several implications that can 
impede the model’s effectiveness should they are not addressed effectively. 
Section 3 will argue that implications arising from the director-shareholder 
agency problem that are related to the establishment of collective action and 
the practice of agency capitalism may affect shareholder power to confer ac-
countability effectively. Though the Directive deals to some extent with these 
issues; the challenges arising because of the costs of participation, free-riding, 
information quality and intermediary incentives to exercise shareholder rights 
need to be addressed more effectively. Section 4 will argue that another im-
plication is found on the basis on which shareholder power is to be exercised. 
This is because shareholder power may be abused as a means of securing 
abnormal short-term returns. The security then of a corporate objective that 
ensures that shareholder power is exercised for conferring accountability for 
the company’s sustainable growth is paramount. Section 5 will conclude that 
the 2017 Shareholder Rights Directive is only the starting point towards the 
facilitation of a model where shareholders act as an accountability body. As 
such, European company law should take these practical implications into ac-
count as well to ensure the model’s effectiveness.
2.  THE 2017 SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE: TOWARDS 
ADOPTING A DEVELOPING MODEL FOR CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE
The 2017 Shareholder Rights Directive seeks to amend the 2007 Shareholder 
Rights Directive and encourage more active shareholder engagement to en-
hance accountability in corporate governance. The first of the changes regard 
the enhancement of shareholder voting power. The Directive acknowledges 
that directors’ remuneration should contribute to the company’s advancement 
of accountability to achieve sustainability in corporate governance using per-
formance criteria related both to financial and stakeholder factors.7 In light of 
this, Article 9a of the 2007 Directive will state that Member States will en-
7 Shareholder Rights Directive 2017, [35]
Intereulaweast, Vol. V (2) 2018
280
sure that companies will establish a remuneration policy for its directors that 
will be subject to shareholder approval.8 However, Member States may provide 
rules for the vote to be advisory; on which case remuneration will be paid to 
directors only in accordance with a remuneration policy that has been submit-
ted for shareholder consideration.9 In addition to that, the 2017 Directive seeks 
to enhance accountability for a number of transactions that may cause preju-
dice to the company.10 Article 9c of the 2007 Directive then will require Mem-
ber States to ensure that companies will publicly announce a number of key 
related-party transactions, which shall be subject to shareholder approval or to 
an approval by the administrative or the supervisory body of the company.11
The 2017 Directive further seeks to contribute to the enhancement of trans-
parency between the company and its respective shareholders. The identifica-
tion of shareholders then becomes a prerequisite to facilitate communication 
between shareholders and the company to encourage better shareholder en-
gagement.12 Based on this premise, Article 3a of the 2007 Directive will state 
that Member States will ensure that national corporate law will allow compa-
nies to identify its respective shareholders,13 and establish a requirement for 
shareholder intermediaries to contribute towards such identification,14 subject 
to compliance with all necessary data protection legislation.15 Furthermore, 
the 2007 Directive will compel such identification when the shareholding 
percentage exceeds 0,5% of the company’s shareholding.16 In addition to the 
identification requirements, the 2017 Directive seeks to enhance transparency 
by implementing rules for the effective transmission of information between 
companies and shareholders. Article 3b then seeks to achieve this by requiring 
Member States to ensure that shareholder intermediaries are required to trans-
8 Shareholder Rights Directive 2007 (as amended by the Shareholder Rights Directive 2017), 
Art. 9a
9 ibid
10 Shareholder Rights Directive 2017, [45]
11 Shareholder Rights Directive 2007 (as amended by the Shareholder Rights Directive 2017), 
Art. 9c
12 Shareholder Rights Directive 2017, [4]-[6]
13 Shareholder Rights Directive 2007 (as amended by the Shareholder Rights Directive 2017), 
Art. 3a
14 ibid
15 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016)
16 Shareholder Rights Directive 2007 (as amended by the Shareholder Rights Directive 2017), 
Art. 3a (1)
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mit all necessary information required for the shareholder to be able to exer-
cise its rights effectively; or give notice of the availability of such information 
in case they are available online.17 
In addition, the 2017 Directive acknowledges that the active exercise of share-
holder power by institutional shareholders and shareholder intermediaries is 
significant to facilitate accountability for corporate governance.18 The impor-
tance of the existence of such intermediaries and institutional shareholders is 
undoubted. Institutional shareholders and intermediaries can reduce signifi-
cantly issues related to the inability of shareholders to exercise their power 
efficiently as a result of the wide dispersion in shareholding ownership that 
was noted in public corporations.19 Furthermore, shareholder intermediaries 
and institutional shareholders can utilise their expertise to actively exercise 
shareholding rights. In light of this, Article 3c of the 2007 Directive will state 
that all intermediaries and institutional investors’ asset managers will engage 
with exercising shareholder rights.20 
In addition, Article 3g will impose an obligation on institutional shareholders 
to disclose their engagement policy on a comply-or-explain basis; which will 
entail details related to the monitoring of the investee company or outline the 
engagement of shareholder rights for relevant matters including investment 
strategy and the corporate financial performance and risk.21 Article 3i of the 
2007 Directive will require asset managers to disclose on an annual basis the 
means the investment strategy is being implemented for the medium to long-
17 Shareholder Rights Directive 2007 (as amended by the Shareholder Rights Directive 2017), 
Art. 3b
18 Shareholder Rights Directive 2017, [9], [14], [15]
19 Mallin C.: Institutional investors: the vote as a tool of governance, Journal of Manage-
ment Governance, 16  2012, p.180; Gillan, S. L., Starks, L.T.: Corporate Governance Pro-
posals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, Journal of Finance and 
Economics,  57 2000, pp. 278–79; Rose, P.: The Corporate Governance Industry, Journal of 
Corporate Law, 32 2007, p. 887. On the history of the dispersion of shareholding ownership in 
the US and Europe see in general Morck R. (ed): A History of Corporate Governance Around 
the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, University of Chicago Press, 
2007; Wells, H.: A Long View Of Shareholder Power: From The Antebellum Corporation 
To The Twenty-First Century, Florida Law Review, 67 2015; Berle A.A; Means, G.G.: The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised ed., New Jersey, 1991; Davies, P.: Share-
holders in the United Kingdom in  Hill, J.G. and Thomas, R.S. (eds.):  Research Handbook on 
Shareholder Power, Cheltenham, 2015; Cheffins, B. R.: Law as Bedrock: The Foundations of 
an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
23 2003
20 Shareholder Rights Directive 2007 (as amended by the Shareholder Rights Directive 2017), 
Art. 3c
21 ibid Art.3g
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term performance of the assets of the institutional investor, which will include, 
among other information, how the investment strategy will affect the medi-
um to long-term financial and non-financial performance of the company.22 
Moreover, Member States under Article 3j will be responsible for ensuring 
that proxy advisors will apply, on a comply-or-explain basis, a code of conduct 
which shall be disclosed to shareholders; and are required to publicly disclose 
on an annual basis how they are undertaking their duties for shareholders with 
regards to the preparation of research, advice and voting recommendations.23 
Moreover, to facilitate further engagement, the 2007 Directive will further 
require Member States to ensure that there is no discrimination in the incur-
rence of costs for shareholders on cross-border voting, unless justified where 
such costs will reflect the variation of actual costs on the implementation or 
provision of the services as a means of mitigating costs and encourage further 
engagement.24
The 2017 Directive manifests the EU regulators’ attempts to conform with 
an international set of thinking in corporate governance that seeks to adopt a 
corporate governance model where shareholders exercise their power to pro-
vide accountability in corporate governance. The emergence of this idea is not 
new. The beginning of the 21st century came with the emergence of several 
corporate scandals, both in the US and Europe,25 that led to the reconsider-
ation of the prevailing model of absolute managerial control; and the sugges-
tion of more active shareholder participation to counter managerial indiscre-
tion.26 Based on this model, shareholders can utilise their power to improve 
the decision-making process through monitoring the executive management 
for the long-term interests of the company. This model sees shareholders as 
being more responsible for the affairs of the company, whose active exercise 
of their rights will mitigate corporate inefficiencies by signalling managerial 
irregularities or malperformance.27 Shareholders then with their expertise and 
power will have a responsibility towards the company they invested in to keep 
22 ibid Art.3i
23 ibid Art. 3j
24 ibid Art 3d
25 See in general Fox, L.: Enron: Rise and Fall, Hoboken, 2003; Bava, F.; Devalle, A.: Corpo-
rate governance and best practices: the Parmalat case, GSTF Business Review, 2 2012; Eriks-
son, K.: Corporate Governance in the European Union post-Enron, Business Law Review, 15 
2003. 
26 ibid; see also Armour, J. et al.:  Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate 
Governance, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41 2003, p.542
27 Bebchuck, L. B.: The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, Harvard Law Review, 118 
2005, p. 892
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the management accountable. It must be noted that this model does not seek 
to inhibit the ability of the management to take decisions. On the contrary, 
this model seeks to provide the ability to shareholders to raise their concerns 
and pursuit changes only when the management’s actions affect the company 
adversely.28 On this premise then, shareholder power enables certain question-
able managerial actions to be subject to shareholder consent or control to en-
sure that responsible governance is at all times upheld.
The merits of this model are numerous. An effective shareholder engagement 
is cornerstone to upholding good corporate governance; and can enhance the 
checks and balances between the different organs of the company.29  This is 
because shareholders, through the exercise of their rights, can contribute to 
the advancement of accountability in corporate governance by using of their 
rights to monitor questionable managerial actions or actions that may signifi-
cantly deter corporate performance. In this way, shareholders can significant-
ly counter managerial opportunism or inefficient performance;30 and thus act 
as a corrective mechanism in corporate governance which contributes to the 
enhancement of accountability internally.31 Furthermore, the active exercise 
of shareholder rights can improve corporate performance, by taking as well 
into account issues related to the company’s stakeholders and its responsibility 
towards the society in general.32 Shareholder power then can be used not only 
for the furtherance of shareholder interests, but also for furthering the com-
pany’s sustainable growth, which will secure their interests as well through 
the pursuit of good corporate governance. The combination of both will fur-
ther contribute to the efficient operation of European capital markets; which 
will increase confidence in the undertaking of cross-border business that will 
enhance both the Internal Market and the national economies of European 
Member States as well. An effective exercise then of shareholder rights as an 
accountability mechanism will enable shareholders to assess the company’s 
relative performance and sustainable growth.33 
28 Hill, J.: Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 48 2000, p.60
29 Fama, E.F.; Jensen, M.C.: Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 26 1983, pp. 301-310




33 On the meaning of sustainable growth for a company see Keay, A.: The Corporate Objec-
tive, Cheltenham, 2011 
Intereulaweast, Vol. V (2) 2018
284
Nevertheless, the efforts made for the adoption of this model via the 2017 
Directive bear a number of material implications that need to be addressed 
by European and national corporate law more effectively to ensure that share-
holders will actually contribute to the enhancement of accountability in corpo-
rate governance under this model. 
3.  THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL SHAREHOLDER-DIRECTOR 
AGENCY PROBLEM: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND AGENCY 
CAPITALISM
The multidimensional shareholder-director agency problem creates a number 
of practical implications that can impede the effectiveness of shareholder pow-
er as an accountability mechanism should they are not addressed effectively 
by corporate governance regulation to facilitate such a model for corporate 
governance. When the management falls short of their responsibility to secure 
the company’s sustainable coverage of its liabilities,34 the need for shareholder 
monitoring generates a number of agency costs.35 In theory, the single owner 
of all shareholding of a company will try to keep the management accountable 
regardless of the costs, as the sustainable running of the company is of par-
amount concern to the sole shareholder.36 In the context of public companies 
though, the costs of keeping directors accountable may exceed the advantage 
shareholders will have to keep directors accountable, thus making them dis-in-
terested or unable to monitor directors by themselves.37 For this reason, share-
holders are required to undertake a collective action as a means to mitigate 
agency costs incurred from the need to keep the management accountable. 
Collective action though poses a number of additional agency problems,38 as 
additional costs are required to be incurred to co-ordinate shareholder incen-
34 Bainbridge, S. M.: Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, Van-
derbilt Law Review, 55 2002, p.10
35 Fama, E.G.; Jensen, M.C.; Agency Problems and Residual Claims, The Journal of Law & 
Economics, 26 (2) 1983, pp. 330-334
36 ibid
37 Black, B.S.: Shareholder Passivity Re-examined, Michigan Law Review, 89 1990, p. 566. 
Corporate Governance systems with an administrative body or supervisory board bear addition-
al agency problems and costs as a result of the need to co-ordinate the administrative body or 
supervisory board to correct managerial inefficiencies. For the dimension of such problems in 
Germany see in general Schulz, M.; Wasmeier, O.: The Law of Business Organizations: A Con-
cise Overview of German Corporate Law, Berlin, 2012, pp. 40-53; du Plessis, J. et al.:  German 
Corporate Governance in International and European Context (2nd edn), Berlin, 2012, p. 159
38 Rock, E.B.: The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 
The Georgetown Law Journal, 79 1990, p. 453
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tives and ensure the action’s success.39 The incentives of shareholders then to 
engage in a collective action become material. The traditional logic behind 
shareholder collective action typically sees shareholders finding it difficult to 
engage in a collective action. This idea is attributed to Olson’s fundamental 
work, the “Logic of Collective Action”.40 To Olson, individuals in a large group 
driven by their self-interest and economic rationality will typically engage in a 
collective action only when the advantage provided from the collective action 
is greater than the costs incurred to undertake such a collective action.41 Thus, 
any group to which the advantage conferred on each individual is outweighed 
by the costs or the advantage conferred is zero will be latent. For Olson though, 
individuals of a large group will find it difficult to engage in a collective action 
given the group’s size; and will thus be latent.42 This is because individuals in a 
large group may find it difficult or less rational to engage in a collective action 
with each abstention of an individual from the collective action. The amount 
of the advantage conferred to each shareholder will be minimised with each 
abstention of a shareholder, as fewer members will have to bear the costs of the 
collective action, and thus be less rational for the bearers of the cost to engage 
as the advantage for them will be continuously minimised.43 
The traditional idea of collective action problems reflects a fraction of the 
practical implications shareholders face when there is a need to take a col-
lective action to exercise their rights. A shareholder who is primarily incen-
tivised by its own self-interest or engage in a collective action based on what 
is considered economically rational may engage in a collective action when it 
determines that managerial accountability will confer significant advantages, 
especially if the action will be engaged by a good number of shareholders that 
can reduce  agency costs incurred per individual shareholder.44 Based on Ol-
son’s understanding though, shareholders may not find collective action to be 
in their best interests,45 since the need for a collective action in a large group 
of shareholders makes co-ordination of interests difficult.46 
39 ibid
40 Olson, M.: The Logic of Collective Action, London, 1971
41 Ibid pp. 37; 61-63; 174
42 Ibid p. 48
43 Ibid p. 53
44 Sharfman, B.S.: Activist Hedge Funds In A World Of Board Independence: Creators Or 
Destroyers Of Long-Term Value?, Columbia Business Law Review, 2015, pp. 824-825
45 Coffee, J.C.: Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 
Columbia Law Review, 91 1991, pp. 1310-1318
46 Bainbridge, S.M.: Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis, Oxford, 2012, pp. 
240- 245; Wachter, BW.: The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review, 158 2009, p. 653 
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The parallel implication of free-riding though further impedes the fruition of 
collective action. If a number of shareholders will choose not to engage in the 
collective action,47 they may still enjoy the fraction of all advantages produced 
by that collective action should it is initiated.48 The costs of intervention can 
be incurred by the participants in the collective action, but the benefit will still 
be shared, even at a smaller fraction. Thus, a shareholder may find free-rid-
ing an advantageous alternative than participation.49  But should a collective 
action arises, free-riding acts to the detriment of shareholders participating in 
the collective action because of the provision of fewer advantages to them as 
a result of incurring more costs, thus making it costlier to be engaged.50 Since 
shareholders under this logic will engage only when the advantage is signifi-
cant enough to outweigh the costs, the element of free riding can significant-
ly impede the extent collective action will be undertaken, as it can influence 
shareholders not to engage given the growing number of costs and the mini-
mised advantage conferred to them.51  
The traditional logic of collective action correctly identifies several material 
problems in establishing shareholder collective action. This includes the ma-
terial issue of costs, free-riding and the limited incentives in engaging in such 
an action in the absence of a significant advantage. However, the traditional 
logic of collective action does not entirely resonate with all material consider-
ations in need to be taken when considering collective action in the corporate 
context. Firstly, collective action can be as beneficial as any other alternative 
course of action in terms of choices available to each individual in a group.52 
This is because the only way an individual can get any advantage or most 
of the advantage conferred from a collective action will be to refrain from 
free-riding or not participating at all.53 In the corporate context then, share-
holders will have to consider whether collective action is advantageous enough 
in comparison with alternative courses of action.
Secondly, the extent of latency for shareholders in the corporate context does 
not depend much on the number of shareholders, but on the degree of concen-
47 Moore, Petrin (n 30), p. 118
48 Grossman, S.J.; Hart, O.J.: Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, And The Theory Of 
The Corporation, The Bell Journal of Economics, 11 1980, p. 42
49 Rock (n 38) pp. 454; 461
50 ibid
51 Schelling, T.C.:  Micromotives And Macrobehaviour, New York, 1978, pp. 213-243
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tration of shareholding ownership.54 Latency then for a shareholder collective 
action depends on the smallest efficacious group of shareholders that has the 
incentives and voting power to engage in a collective action. The smallest effi-
cacious group is based on the degree of concentration of shareholding owner-
ship and the extent shareholder voting power and influence of the efficacious 
group can be sufficient in engaging in a collective action.55 This means that 
the larger the concentration is in a company, the easier the smallest efficacious 
group can be found to engage in a collective action.56 If the advantage from a 
collective action to keep the management accountable will not be provided un-
less the full costs of engagement are being paid; and provided that each share-
holder holds information about the number of shareholders that can form an 
efficacious group to undertake that collective action; an effective efficacious 
group can be created to hold such collective action as a means to provide the 
advantage to the whole of the group.57 
Because of this, a shareholder must decide the best course of action for it-
self based on the information the shareholder holds about the existence of 
an efficacious group capable of undertaking that very collective action effec-
tively to confer the advantage to shareholders.58 Should the information indi-
cates that an advantage is capable of being conferrable to shareholders, the 
choice for shareholders to engage in a collective action becomes a matter of 
the best course of action available compared to alternative courses of action. 
Free riding for example will affect shareholder collective action only when 
the free-riding behaviour will disable the ease or the ability to form an ef-
ficacious group.59If high concentration though renders collective action fea-
sible, free-riding becomes less favourable, as the probability of not getting 
any advantage is increasing with the increase in probability of not forming an 
efficacious group, since its abstention will increase the possibility of rendering 
collective action unachievable and the shareholder not getting any advantage.60 
The same applies to considerations regarding exiting the company.61 If other 
54 Hardin, R.: Collective Action, Baltimore, 1983, pp. 25-26
55 Rasmussen, E.: Games And Information: An Introduction To Game Theory, Oxford, 1981, 
pp. 43-53
56 ibid
57 Rock (n 38) p. 458
58 ibid
59 Ibid p. 460
60 Hirschman, A.: Exit, Voice, And Loyalty: Responses To Decline In Firms, Organizations, 
And States, London, 1970, Chapters 2 and 3 
61 Rock (n 38) p. 461
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factors do not contribute to render exiting the company a feasible option;62 the 
provision of the advantage from the collective action for each individual share-
holder increases with the rate of concentration of the company.63 Shareholders 
then will engage in a collective action even when the advantage provided is 
actually zero, to the extent the rest of the alternative courses of action are not 
more beneficial than engagement in a collective action. 
Thirdly, shareholders tend to be incentivised by other axioms to those of 
self-interest and economic rationality as well.64 In trying to explain how latent 
groups can still engage in a collective action, Olson identified that individuals 
may be compelled to engage in a collective action to mitigate any further loss-
es in advantages;65 or possess selective incentives arising from potential ad-
vantages privately to each individual should a collective action is undertaken.66 
In addition to these, other axioms may incentivise shareholders to engage in a 
collective action.67 Such axioms include convention arising from the frequent 
exercise of shareholder rights;68 incentives with regards to fairness and respon-
sibility to correct corporate wrongs to this extent;69 economically extrarational 
behaviour that drives them into such an engagement,70 such as actions accruing 
from moralistic pursuits;71 sentiment arising from the shareholders’ relation-
ship and attachment to the company;72 and the idea of social responsibility as a 
means to correct corporate wrongs affecting the society in general.73 
These axioms are capable of further bolstering the feasibility of shareholders 
engaging in a collective action. If a collective action is undertaken from share-
holders that have different axioms, shareholders can keep the management 
accountable as a by-product of the relative incentives to contribute into a col-
62 Ibid p. 462
63 ibid
64 Woidtke, T.: Agents watching agents?: evidence from pension fund ownership and firm 
value, Journal of Finance and Economics. 63 2002, p. 104 
65 Olson (n 39) p. 91
66 Reisman, D.A.: Theories Of Collective Action, Basingstoke, 1990, pp.156; 164
67 Ibid 
68 ibid
69 Ibid p. 169
70 Ibid 
71  Marshall, A.: Principles of Economics, New York, 1920, p. 253
72  Reisman (n 66) p. 171
73  Sommer, A. A. Jr.: Whom Should the Corporation Serve--The Berle-Dodd Debate Revist-
ed Sixty Years
Later, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 16 1991, p.35
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lective action.74 Based on the level of concentration of shareholding ownership 
and the availability of information, shareholders have the ability to convert or 
utilise their power based on their incentives to keep the management account-
able as a means to gain their desired advantage that managerial accountability 
will provide it.75 Thus, if a shareholder or an efficacious group determines that 
it may be irrational for shareholders to engage in a collective action because 
of the limited availability of an advantage or the collective action stands as 
less advantageous from other alternative courses of action; shareholders may 
determine rational to organise shareholders incentivised from different axioms 
to ensure that the advantage is to be provided through the common goal of 
achieving managerial accountability.76 
Therefore, subject to the existence of other axioms that may require account-
ability by shareholders important, shareholders will engage in a collective ac-
tion if concentration in shareholding ownership will allow shareholders gaining 
an advantage high enough in comparison to any alternative courses of action. 
At this point, it must be noted that several parameters determine the extent 
shareholder collective action is a feasible option to shareholders. The first of 
the parameters concern the amount of costs. The 2017 Directive has made its 
efforts to alleviate costs through the introduction of rules for non-discrimina-
tion in costs between national and cross-border exercise of shareholder rights. 
The introduction of these rules will definitely assist in the encouragement of 
shareholders exercising their rights more frequently, especially at a cross-bor-
der level.77 In addition, the transparency laws introduced by the Directive will 
further mitigate costs and thus contribute to better engagement.78 Nevertheless, 
internal agency costs vary to a significant extent from company to company 
and depends much on the action in need to be taken and the company’s inter-
nal controls.79 This is because, active shareholder participation requires the 
assessment and adoption of a number of strategies, in addition to the need to 
align such strategies with the various shareholder interests to minimise the 
74 Fama, E. F.: Agency Problems And The Theory Of The Firm, Journal of Political Economy, 
88 1980, pp. 292-295
75 ibid
76 Hardin (n 54) p. 31
77 Belcredi, M.; Ferrarini, G.: Corporate boards, incentive pay and shareholder activism in 
Europe: main issues and policy perspectives in Belcredi, M.; Ferrarini, G. (eds): Boards and 
Shareholders in European Listed Companies: Facts, Context and Post-Crisis Reforms, Cam-
bridge, 2013, p.13
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risk of failure.80  Such costs can be further mitigated if shareholders are more 
readily encouraged to use electronic means to exercise their rights or assess 
the likeliness of engaging in a collective action. While European corporate 
law has encouraged the introduction of electronic voting for shareholders as a 
means to alleviate further the costs of participation,81 the rigorous and active 
encouragement of shareholders to use electronic means or the better adminis-
tration of the disclosure of information using online public records will assist 
in further mitigating costs.
The second parameter is the information available to shareholders. If the infor-
mation about the efficacious group capable of undertaking the collective action 
is enough for a shareholder to consider that it is needed to engage in collective 
action, a shareholder will require to use that information and assess the via-
bility of engaging in such an action. Similarly, the engagement of a collective 
action much relies not only on the information each shareholder has for each 
shareholder, but also on information related to the company as well, which is 
subject to managerial control.82 The 2017 Directive’s rules on the disclosure of 
information and the achievement of transparency by disclosing the shareholder 
engagement policy publicly will materially contribute to easier access to in-
formation, which will assist in more active shareholder participation. Notwith-
standing, the quality of information remains an issue. While the transmission 
of such information will readily make shareholders capable of engaging in a 
collective action to keep the management accountable more effectively, the ex-
tent they will engage in such an action relies much not only on the quantity and 
accessibility of information, but also on its quality. If the information submit-
ted bears practical inaccuracies, shareholders may find themselves not only in 
a difficult position to engage in a collective action regardless of the availability 
of information, but also find themselves as poor accountability monitors for 
corporate governance.83 Though corporate information quality has gone up 
over the recent years,84 the need for ensuring the standard of quality remains 
of paramount importance as well.
80 Gilson, R.J.; Gordon, J.N.: The Agency Costs Of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors 
And The Revaluation Of Governance Rights, Columbia Law Review, 113 2013, p. 874
81 Shareholder Rights Directive 2007 (as amended by the Shareholder Rights Directive 2017), 
Art. 8
82 Galbraith, J.K.: The new industrial state (Reprint), Princeton, 2007, p.96
83 Berglöf, E.;Pajuste, A.: What Do Firms Disclose and Why? Enforcing Corporate Gover-
nance and Transparency in Central and Eastern Europe, EFA 2005 Moscow Meeting, 2005, 
pp. 9-11
84 Vincke, F., Heimann, F. (ed.): Fighting corruption A Corporate Practices Manual, ICC, 
2003, p. 135
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The final parameter lies in the introduction of shareholder intermediaries and 
the rise of institutional shareholders. This is because the effective exercise of 
shareholder rights now relies much on the extent asset managers of institu-
tional shareholders or other intermediaries will have the incentives to use the 
information available to exercise their shareholder rights effectively.85 To many 
asset managers of private funds or hedge funds or other shareholder interme-
diaries, the exercise of shareholder rights must be cost-effective to be rendered 
as a feasible solution for them in terms of their engagement; or selective in-
centives must require their exercise important.86 The existence of alternative 
courses of action though may be regarded more beneficial to them.87 Regard-
less of the fact that collective action will provide an advantage to sharehold-
ers that can be more beneficial than alternative courses of action, institutional 
shareholders typically hold diversified portfolios of shareholding in various 
companies as a means of ensuring the beneficiaries’ interests.88 
Asset managers however, because of this diversification, may not consider en-
gagement in the collective action of a company beneficial, irrespective of the 
fact that the exercise of shareholder rights can provide advantages that are in 
the best interests of such beneficiaries should the action is successful.89 The 
reason behind this rests on the fact that asset managers typically act based on 
the information they hold to make their portfolio more competitive or attrac-
tive for their current and future beneficiaries. Asset managers then may be 
concerned to use the information to engage in alternative courses of action to 
ensure that current beneficiaries’ funds are maintained instead of exercising 
shareholder rights and engage in a collective action, which bears a sufficient 
element of risk of failure.90 This means though that asset managers may be 
more predominantly concerned with the advancement of the competitiveness 
of their portfolio instead of them conferring accountability in the investee 
company.91 The same applies to shareholders that are not incentivised primari-
ly from profit, such as pension funds and/or other groups holding shares or in-
85 Gilson, R.J.; Gordon, J.N.: ‘Agency Capitalism: Further implications of equity interme-
diation’ in Hill, J.G. and Thomas, R.S. (eds.):  Research Handbook on Shareholder Power, 
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dividual shareholders,92 as they may face the same disincentives as asset man-
agers in private equity funds and hedge funds.93 To the extent fiduciary duties 
do not apply to the manager of such funds that render participation important 
or mandatory,94 managers of such groups or individuals may be reluctant to 
undertake an engagement in a collective action, especially if funding for such 
intervention is minimal or if the management is closely tied with the company 
and/or its beneficiary groups.95 Free-riding therefore, because of the existence 
of such intermediaries and their incentives can surface as a result of a possible 
abstention from the collective action, that can impede the development of an 
efficacious group to undertake the collective action and thus the conferring of 
any advantage at all to shareholders or the provision of accountability.
An effective corporate governance model therefore requires the consideration 
of two key factors to counter intermediary disincentives to exercise shareholder 
rights.96 The first is the encouragement of shareholders to exercise their rights to 
keep the management accountable. The encouragement of shareholders exercis-
ing their rights can have its basis on facilitating more power and influence within 
the corporate structure to monitor the management effectively. This is something 
that the Directive provides to some extent through the introduction of voting on 
the remuneration policy and the approval of material related-party transactions. 
Both powers can surely contribute to the facilitation of more active engagement 
and greater accountability. The voting on the remuneration policy gives the abil-
ity to shareholders to raise their concerns about excesses in remuneration when 
such remuneration does not crystallize corporate performance.97 Similarly, the 
voting on related-party transactions will give shareholders the ability to take an 
advisory role in the affairs of the company, especially when there are significant 
changes in its construction, thus rendering them an adequate voice in bringing 
changes to the company for its sustainable growth.98
92 ibid
93 Gilson, Gordon (n 80) p. 874
94 Mccormack, G.: Sexy but not sleazy: trustee investments and ethical considerations (Unit-
ed Kingdom), The Company Lawyer, 19(2) 1998, p. 40
95 Thomas, R.S.: Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 
Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 530, available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/
facpub/530 
96 Chiu, I.; Katelouzou; D.:  From Shareholder Stewardship to Shareholder Duties: Is the Time 
Ripe?, Nordic & European Company Law LSN Research Paper Series no 18-10, 2017, p. 143
97 Thomas, R.S.: Say on Pay Around the World, Washington University Law Review, 92 
2015, p.711
98 Roth, M.: Related Party Transactions, 2016, Available at SSRN at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2710128 
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Despite their significance, both powers can be subject to a number of implica-
tions that may tamper their usefulness or effectiveness.  The use of voting on 
the remuneration policy may be of limited use to shareholders in Continental 
Europe where shareholders hold enough concentration and can thus keep the 
management accountable without relying on their remuneration to exert disci-
pline.99 Nevertheless, if shareholder dispersion in Continental Europe continues 
to disperse because of the continuing convergence of ideals and the interna-
tionalization of equity capital markets, the voting on remuneration policy can 
become an adequate tool in shareholders upholding accountability.100 On the 
same premise, the approval of related-party transactions much depend on the 
definition of related-party transactions; the boundaries each Member State has 
on such related-party transactions; and the extent such transactions are deter-
mined to be either subject to approval or falling within self-dealing.101 Even if 
these implications do not stand as an impediment of shareholders taking an ad-
equate vote on such matters, national legal barriers which may preclude either 
intra-shareholder communication. Similarly, the agenda setting of the general 
meeting for such voting becomes subject to national law regulation, which may 
not provide ample time for shareholder to reflect on the matters available for 
them effectively.102 Such barriers however can hinder substantially the extent 
these rights are to be exercised efficiently, thus discouraging active shareholder 
engagement. A legal framework that assists further in the facilitation of active 
voice apart from the provision of such powers becomes mandatory as well for 
the facilitation of such model by European company law. 
The second factor is the establishment of requiring the exercise or engagement 
of shareholder rights. Such a duty has been introduced over the years in sev-
eral jurisdictions in the EU on a voluntary basis through the introduction of 
national soft-law of stewardship that define asset managers’ responsibilities.103 
The creation of a soft law notion of stewardship though may not be enough in 
compelling shareholders to engage in keeping the management accountable 
99 Milbourn, T.T.: Financial Systems and Corporate Governance, Journal of Institutional & 
Theoretical Economics, 154 1998, p. 174
100 Bratton, W.W.; McCahery, J.A.: Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of 
the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
38 1999, p.234
101 Moscariello, N.: Related Party Transactions in Continental European Countries: Evi-
dence from Italy, International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 2011, p. 130
102 Masouros, P. E.: Is the EU Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously? An Essay on the Impo-
tence of Shareholdership in Corporate Europe, European Company Law, 7 2010, p.200
103 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), The UK Stewardship Code 2010, 2012, see https://
www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Stewardship-Code.
aspx. 
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effectively.104 This is because, in the absence of hard-law compelling share-
holders to exercise their rights, shareholders may as well provide justification 
for not exercising such rights. As such, stewardship soft-laws may stand unable 
to change many of institutional shareholders’ current practices or induce them 
to be more active participants in corporate governance.105 
On the same premise, the 2017 Directive requires shareholder engagement 
through the requirement of exercising shareholder rights and the disclosure 
of shareholder engagement policy and its exercise on a comply-or-explain ba-
sis.106 Though it seems that the 2017 Directive’s introduction of law will bear 
the same issues as national stewardship laws so far, Katelouzou and Chiu ar-
gue that the difference of the now 2017 Directive lies in the expectation from 
shareholders to at least engage with the exercise of shareholder rights.107 If 
an institutional shareholder chooses not to exercise its rights and provide an 
explanation to this extent, the Directive’s introduction of laws will assume at 
least a duty of engagement with the company’s corporate governance or the 
exercise of shareholder rights based on the requirement of the disclosure of the 
engagement policy and the means such policy is exercised.108 While this is a 
significant step towards the facilitation of the model of seeing shareholders as 
a credible accountability body, the introduction of an explicit duty for share-
holders to exercise their rights could have introduced more active shareholder 
participation. Nevertheless, the introduction of such a duty requires the careful 
consideration of a number of related issues, both at a national and Europe-
an level.  Such issues include the consideration of the legal interpretation of 
shareholder fiduciary duties at a national level, the extent the introduction of 
such duties conform with the practices and realities of each national corporate 
legal system, the basis on which shareholders should exercise their rights and 
the purpose of exercising such rights and the position of shareholders in the 
company. 
4.  THE BASIS OF EXERCISING SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS
One of the key factors that determine materially the effectiveness of sharehold-
er power as an accountability mechanism is the extent shareholder rights will 
104 Cheffins, B.R., The Stewardship Code’s Achilles’ Heel, University of Cambridge Faculty 
of Law Research Paper No. 28/2011, 2011, p. 17
105 ibid
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actually be exercised to confer accountability to the company for its sustain-
able growth.109 This is because of the possible abuse of power by shareholders 
to secure short-term profits.110 As shareholder rights are costly to be exercised, 
shareholders may seek short-term returns to cover the costs of exercising their 
rights and accumulate as much returns as possible, irrespective of the fact that 
such course of action will be to the detriment of the company.111 Shareholder 
rights then can be used to exercise accountability not for the company’s best 
functioning and performance, but for the security of more returns to its share-
holders through the exercise of their rights. Such behavior though may worsen 
because of the limited investment horizon of shareholders in modern compa-
nies.112 As many shareholders now hold their shares for a limited amount of 
time, a number of shareholders may exercise their rights to secure more profits 
prior to their departure from the company.113 This resonates with another im-
pediment of agency capitalism. Asset managers are prone to using shareholder 
power to secure more residual returns that will confer better returns for their 
beneficiaries; or increase share market value as a means of advancing the port-
folio’s competitiveness in the equity capital market.114 Similarly, shareholder 
intermediaries may follow shareholder demands or choose the best course of 
action for the interests of shareholder, which may not entail achieving account-
ability in corporate governance.115 
The extent then shareholder power can be used as an accountability mech-
anism is contested by the very fact that shareholder power can be used for 
adverse purposes as well.116 Though shareholders have the capability to con-
fer accountability in corporate governance should their agency problems are 
alleviated, they can as well compel the board to undertake myopic actions to 
109 ibid
110 Bebchuk, L.: The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, Columbia Law 
Review, 113 2013, p.1658
111 Easterbrook, F.H.; Fischel, D.R.; Voting in Corporate Law, Journal of Law & Economics, 
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112 ibid
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secure short-term profits; with catastrophic consequences for the company.117 
This is bolstered by the fact that the capital market’s inevitable short-termism 
influences shareholders to have short-term horizons in each company, and as 
such penalize directors should they undertake a corporate policy that does not 
crystallize on share value.118 This means though that accountability in cor-
porate governance through the exercise of shareholder power can become a 
secondary obligation for shareholders, if it can be an obligation at all. 
EU company law then requires the establishment of a corporate objective upon 
which shareholders will exercise their rights to adequately confer accountabili-
ty for advancing corporate performance and sustainability. The 2017 Directive 
acknowledges this and seeks to provide a solution by requiring asset managers 
to disclose in their engagement policy how their policy will contribute to the 
medium to long-term performance of their assets, which will include the eval-
uation of the medium to long-term financial and non-financial performance of 
the company. Through this orientation, the Directive seeks to provide a bench-
mark for an optimal behavior for shareholders when exercising their rights. 
By calling shareholders to engage in corporate governance with a medium 
to long-term orientation of asset performance which will include medium to 
long-term financial and non-financial corporate performance, the Directive 
attempts to set a standard for the exercise of shareholder rights by requiring 
the consideration of the performance of shareholding assets, which can regard 
corporate performance as a means of regarding public interest objectives as 
well.119 
The extent this orientation will contribute to mitigating short-termism though 
is contestable. The medium to long-term orientation of the pursuit of share-
holder power based on asset performance seems to conform with an interna-
tional set of thinking that shareholder power can contribute to the advancement 
of the share’s long-term value.120 This orientation has its basis on the principle 
of shareholder primacy, which set share value and its wealth maximization as 
the prime determinants of the medium to long-term performance of the share-
holders’ assets.121 These metrics however cannot ensure that good governance 
117 Anderson, R.: The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, Georgetown Mason Law 
Review, 23 2015), p. 29
118 Grossman, N.: Turning a Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties 
in A New Era, University of Michigan Journal of Legal Reform, 43 2010, pp. 923-31
119 Chiu, Katelouzou (n 96), p. 146
120 Bebchuck (n 27) p. 892
121 On the rise of shareholder primacy see Friedman, M.: The Social Responsibility of Busi-
ness Is to Increase Its Profits, New York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970; Jensen, M.C.; 
Meckling, W.C.: Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership struc-
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practices are adopted, irrespective of the medium to long-term orientation.122 
Firstly, the medium to long-term orientation on asset performance seems to lie 
partly on the rationale that asset performance based on the share’s value in the 
capital market is indicative of the company’s performance,123 since the capital 
market is stated to be efficient enough to determine such good or bad gov-
ernance practices because of changes in share value.124 Behavioral econom-
ics studies though show that investor biases, such as short-term overvaluation 
as medium to long-term value,125 or acknowledging increases of a company’s 
value as indicative of medium to long-term sustainable development,126 ren-
der shareholders unable to configure whether good governance practices are 
adopted based on value so as to exercise their rights to confer accountability 
based on it.127 This is because the extent shareholders choose between short-
term or medium to long-term asset performance based on value can be dubi-
ous; as both estimates tend to cancel each other out. For short-term value to 
differ significantly from medium to long-term value so as for shareholders to 
pursue the latter based on the Directive’s wording and rationale, there is a need 
for a capital market that is efficient enough so as to indicate that the sharehold-
ers’ exercise of rights to accumulate short-term profit will confer substantially 
greater returns than the price of long-term share value.128 The abovementioned 
biases however; and shareholders’ possible inclinations for short-term returns 
because of these biases; may be offset by what is determined to be long-term 
value of the company, thus making the difference between the two limited 
and incapable of showing good governance practices.129 To add to that, the 
information available must be of such quality that must crystallize great devia-
ture, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (1976), p. 312. On the convergence of corporate gov-
erance systems on shareholder primacy Hansmann, H.; Kraakman, K: The end of history for 
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tion between the company’s actual value to determine short-term or long-term 
value. Nevertheless, several issues related to the quality of information, such 
as inaccuracies on the value of the share or accounting frauds may tamper 
the extent short-term or medium to long-term value will differ or the extent 
the pursuit of either value will lead to the deterioration or the advancement of 
governance practices within the company.130 
Such asymmetry then in configuring short-term and medium to long-term val-
ue cannot not configure the extent shareholder power will advance corporate 
governance practices to uphold accountability based on asset performance.131 
The share value does not relatively make shareholders to keep the manage-
ment accountable for the company’s performance or to uphold good gover-
nance practices, but compels them to act based on what is expected in terms 
of value to them on the belief that value is representative of such performance 
or good governance practices.132 Given however that the difference between 
what is considered short-term or medium to long-term value will be often thin; 
and the fact that information provided in the market bears the possibility to be 
inaccurate; shareholder power exercised on an objective based on value per-
formance may not achieve the responsibility required by the Directive in exer-
cising shareholder rights responsibly to confer accountability, as the corporate 
objective shareholder power is sought to be exercised primarily sees towards 
the share’s best expectation of value performance rather than correcting actual 
governance practices.
Secondly, the medium to long-term orientation on asset performance adopted 
by the 2017 Directive disregards the implications of considering asset perfor-
mance through maximizing returns as a metric of accountability.133 It is un-
doubted that the medium to long-term approach seeks to crystallize the need 
of conferring accountability to achieve more residual returns without imped-
ing the interests of stakeholders.134 But if the difference between short-term 
and medium to long-term value is difficult to be identified and thus incapable 
of determining good governance practices, the introduction of the medium to 
long-term orientation on enhancing asset performance by maximizing returns 
130 Joerg, P. et al.: The Purpose of the Corporation : Shareholder value Maximization?, Euro-
pean Corporate Governance Institute Finance Working Paper No. 95/2005, 2006, p. 13
131 Quiggen, J.:  Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk among Us, Princeton, 2010 
132 Martin (n 124) pp. 12, 21, 23, 193
133 Anderson (n 117) pp. 40
134 Harper Ho, V.: Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance Beyond the Share-
holder-Stakeholder Divide, Journal of Corporate Law, 36 2010, p.62. This is also a theme 
adopted in UK company law under s.172 of the Companies Act 2006. See Keay, A.: The En-
lightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance, Abingdon, 2012, p.70
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is equally not helpful. Since shareholder incentives and the investment horizon 
for each shareholder differ, a shareholder’s pursuit of a medium to long-term 
maximization of wealth to enhance asset performance accordingly depends on 
such incentives and investment horizon, regardless of the Directive’s legisla-
tive text.135 Thus, the medium to long-term orientation in exercising shareholder 
rights becomes a rather relative term for each shareholder, thus making again 
the difference of long-term or short-term rather thin. As with value orientation, 
the exercise of shareholder rights to ensure wealth maximization to improve 
asset performance bear the risk of adopting practices that may not ensure the 
company’s sustainability or its controlled sustainable growth. If sharehold-
er rights are exercised to keep the management accountable for maximizing 
wealth in the long-term as per the Directive’s wording, accountability will be 
conferred for securing such wealth maximization that is expected to be long-
term performance of assets from the shareholder’s own end, which is subject 
to its investment horizon and their incentives when exercising their rights.136 
Given however that the difference of long-term and short-term maximization 
of returns is a dubious metric because of its relativity; an orientation of exercis-
ing shareholder rights based on asset performance through maximizing wealth 
does not assist in any meaningful way in configuring whether good governance 
practices are actually adopted through the exercise of shareholder rights. 
The foregoing arguments resonate with another impediment of placing an ori-
entation based on asset performance as a primary concern for shareholders. 
Even if the orientation of such asset performance is in the medium to the long-
term, the primary focus of exercising shareholder power based on it is capable 
of inducing shareholders in engaging in activities that do not regard good gov-
ernance practices, irrespective of the fact that financial or non-financial perfor-
mance of the company is stated to be included as an assessment consideration. 
If shareholders are incentivized by their own self-interest and calculative ratio-
nality, then the pursuit of shareholder power for profit may lead to short-term 
activities if the basis on which shareholders will exercise their rights depends 
on either value or return maximization, which stand incapable of considering 
good governance practices. At the same time though, it must be noted that 
shareholders driven by the same axioms or incentivized by other axioms can 
as well exercise their rights even if the advantage conferred to them is zero, as 
they may seek good governance practices or determine that alternative courses 
of action are of no assistance.137 
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This means that the course of action that shareholders may undertake rely 
much on shareholders’ systemic behavior.  Like every person, shareholders or 
its asset managers or other intermediaries are pro-social and responsible indi-
viduals,138 but they are susceptible to biases that can affect their pro-sociali-
ty.139 The real deal then for corporate law is to provide shareholders a basis that 
incentivizes them to act responsibly and use their powers to uphold account-
ability in corporate governance. The Directive’s medium to long-term orienta-
tion on asset performance will find difficulty in achieving that. According to 
Stout, any orientation based on shareholder primacy, and given shareholders’ 
susceptibility to investor biases and informational asymmetries, can incentiv-
ize shareholders to determine that optimal corporate governance is adopted 
only through facilitating greater shareholder returns and the increase of share 
value.140 An orientation as such though does not assist in creating incentives 
to achieve better accountability; nor encourages pro-social shareholders in ex-
ercising their rights for accountability purposes.141 If a shareholder wishes to 
further good corporate governance practices, the exercise of shareholder pow-
er to pursuit such practices may be outweighed by the furtherance of achiev-
ing accountability based on maximizing shareholder wealth or increase share 
value.142 Having this in mind though, and considering that neither metrics are 
indicative of good corporate governance practices, shareholder incentives of 
achieving good governance practices may fail because of their efforts to max-
imize value instead of actually considering the adoption of good governance 
practices for the company’s sustainable growth. 
At this point, it must be acknowledged that the inclusion of considering medium 
to long-term performance of the company in the engagement policy that will re-
gard non-financial performance of the company as well can provide the incentives 
to shareholders to regard good governance practices. Though this may be true, 
the inclusion and consideration of governance practices still exists as a secondary 
consideration when exercising shareholder rights. The primary obligation of share-
holders remains the performance of their assets in the medium to long-term, which 
assumes the exercise of shareholder rights to enhance its value and confer more 
residual returns. Given though that both metrics cannot measure good governance 
practices, the possibility for regarding good governance practices while adopting 
a pursuit of exercising shareholder rights based on asset performance will be out-
weighed by the very pursuit of maximizing asset performance itself. 
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Following this then, European company law must seek the establishment of 
a corporate objective for shareholders that does not seek the enhancement 
of asset performance, but the actual pursuit of good governance practices by 
shareholders for the company’s sustainable growth. If it can be readily agreed 
that shareholders can successfully keep the management accountable in the 
sense that they can bring changes to the company should agency problems 
related to collective action and agency capitalism are alleviated; then the pri-
mary basis on which shareholders must pursue their power lies in the adoption 
of good governance practices for the company’s financial and non-financial 
performance. While the Directive insists on the consideration of asset perfor-
mance as a metric of good governance, the extent shareholders will contribute 
to enhancing accountability in corporate governance under it remains thin.
5.  CONCLUSION
The changes the Directive introduces is definitely a step towards the effective 
facilitation of  a model where shareholder power is used as an accountability 
mechanism in corporate governance. This is being undertaken through the 
enhancement of shareholder power, the encouragement of better engagement; 
the transparency of information; and the alleviation of cross-border costs. 
Nevertheless, a number of material implications need to be addressed more 
effectively by European and national corporate law to ensure the model’s ef-
fectiveness. Firstly, the issues related to the establishment of collective action 
in the corporate context, such as the availability and quality of information, 
the incurrence of costs to exercise shareholder rights, the incentives of asset 
managers to exercise shareholder rights and the element of free-riding can 
significantly affect the extent shareholders will be able to exercise their rights 
effectively. Though the Directive deals to some extent with these issues, the 
possibility of disclosure of inaccurate information, the incurrence of costly 
engagements for corporate governance and the extent shareholder rights will 
be exercised by asset managers or shareholder intermediaries requires better 
regulation and consideration. Similarly, the basis on which shareholder power 
is sought by the Directive equally needs further consideration. This is because 
the prime orientation put on shareholders to regard asset performance will not 
ensure that shareholders will not exercise their rights for short-term purposes; 
nor will assist them in exercising their rights to confer accountability effective-
ly in corporate governance.
The abovementioned implications lead to considerations on whether share-
holders should exercise their rights to influence the control of the company. 
One however should not forget the merits of having shareholders acting as 
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monitors of corporate governance. Shareholders can have the incentives and 
the power because of their position to make material changes to the company 
as a means of upholding accountability. Such advancement of accountability 
can definitely assist in the development of corporate governance regulation, 
but also in the adoption of appropriate corporate practices that will mitigate 
the possibility of having further corporate scandals and economic crises. The 
issue therefore for EU corporate law is not whether it is appropriate to adopt 
a model where shareholders act as an accountability body; but consider the 
extent the implications discussed in this Article can be alleviated by corpo-
rate law to make such a model effective. The Directive then should not be 
regarded as a failed attempt to regulate shareholder rights to be exercised 
for accountability purposes. On the contrary, the 2017 Directive should be 
regarded as the starting point towards the facilitation of a model where share-
holders act as an accountability body. European company law then should 
take the implications discussed in this paper into account as well to ensure 
the model’s effectiveness.
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